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CRITIQUE AND COMMENT 
THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION IN PRIVATE LAW 
DARRYN JENSEN∗ 
[The critics of Peter Birks’ insistence that we should be able to draw a map of the law fail to 
appreciate fully what this mapping is meant to achieve. Mapping the law, properly understood, does 
not seek to deny that the law is a dynamic phenomenon. While our understanding of the law never 
stands completely still, reliance upon relatively stable categories of response-generating events 
ought to remain a key feature of our community’s commitment to the rule of law. This is as true of 
equity as it is of the common law. Mapping the boundaries between these categories is a means of 
managing complexity and enabling the dissemination of the key features of legally relevant events. 
The possibility of difficult disputes being resolved according to law (as opposed to the personal 
authority of an adjudicator) is enhanced where the major contours of the law are, in this way, 
rendered communicable and intelligible to all.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
The late Professor Peter Birks insisted that we should be able to draw a ‘map 
of the law’.1 Birks invoked the mapping analogy in opposition to those who 
advocated the abolition of categories in the study of law. Birks thought that the 
problem of lawyers ‘getting stuck in single categories’ was the result of a lack of 
attention to categorisation.2 Young lawyers were not being taught how the 
categories of the law fit together into a single coherent body of principle and 
were, accordingly, impaired in their dealing with difficult cases — those not 
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obviously contract cases or negligence cases and so on.3 For Birks, the crucial 
matter was identifying the boundaries between categories.4 
Birks’ approach insists upon mutual exclusivity of categories. The law pro-
ceeds on the assumption that there is only one correct answer to any legal 
problem. It is the lawyer’s obligation to find it. One criticism of the mapping 
metaphor and other aspects of Birks’ approach to classification has been that 
mutual exclusivity has not been, historically, an essential characteristic of 
English private law. Stephen Waddams, for example, has noted that ‘the concepts 
of contract, wrongdoing and unjust enrichment have … often worked concur-
rently and cumulatively’.5 He argued that an insistence that every legal interven-
tion can be assigned to a single legal concept ‘is apt to distort an understanding 
of the past, and consequently also of the present’.6 Waddams also suggested that 
the making of a legal map (and every subsequent use of that map) determines the 
shape of the terrain that is being mapped. The analogy between law and cartog-
raphy in Birks’ metaphor is, therefore, an inexact one.7 
Waddams made an important point. In English private law and those legal 
systems derived from it, the practice of the law is logically prior to its descrip-
tion and systematisation, but the description and systematisation has an effect 
upon future practice. Systematisation and categorisation carry a risk that we 
might overlook subtleties and complexities in the prior legal practice.8 It is 
important to acknowledge the existence of this risk, but it should also be 
recognised that a community which places a high value upon like cases being 
decided alike and the existence of a principled basis for those decisions needs an 
efficient means for disseminating the grounds for legal decisions. This need 
generates, in turn, a need for the reasons for decisions to be expressed in 
relatively abstract terms — that is, in terms of the case’s belonging to a category 
of like cases rather than in terms of the particular facts of the case. 
The central thesis of this article is that a strong commitment to a relatively 
stable system of legal categories is an essential element of our community’s 
commitment to the rule of the law. The values of consistency of adjudication and 
the intelligibility of adjudicative processes are more likely to be fulfilled where 
there are rules which dictate outcomes for cases and which are easily communi-
cable from one adjudicator to another. This is as true of the body of law called 
‘equity’ as it is of the common law. Nevertheless, the nature of the things being 
classified has a profound effect upon the way in which the classification process 
must proceed. It will be argued that while Birks’ insistence upon mutual exclu-
 
 3 Ibid. 
 4 Ibid. 
 5 Stephen Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American 
Legal Reasoning (2003) 225. 
 6 Ibid 226. See also Joachim Dietrich, ‘The “Other” Category in the Classification of Obligations’ 
in Andrew Robertson (ed), The Law of Obligations: Connections and Boundaries (2004) 111, 
112. 
 7 Waddams, above n 5, 226. 
 8 See also Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Classification of Obligations and the Impact of Constructivist 
Epistemologies’ (1997) 17 Legal Studies 448, 472, where it is stated that ‘although the reduction 
of knowledge to symbolic form facilitates its communication, conservation and handling (for 
example by a computer), there is a significant loss of information in such a reduction.’ 
     
518 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 31 
     
sivity of categories was sound, his particular conception of the causative event 
underestimated the importance of human attitudes in identifying the significance 
of factual events. It will be proposed that legally relevant events should be 
classified by reference to the basis upon which they are seen to justify, in terms 
of the relevant community’s conception of just conduct, a response of a particu-
lar type. 
I I   THE RULE OF  LAW AND LEGAL CATEGORIES 
Keith Mason has defined the rule of law as the idea that ‘[o]ur society is con-
trolled by legal rules, and those who exercise power within it (including the 
judges) are themselves bound by law.’9 At least three implications can be drawn 
from this definition: 
1 The conduct of people in our society exhibits certain regularities, not 
because people are always naturally inclined to behave in those ways, but 
because they are observing rules which they believe they ought to obey. 
These regularities enable people to form reasonable expectations about the 
conduct of others and, accordingly, interact with one another in an orderly 
fashion. 
2 The response of state coercion to any departure from these regularities of 
conduct is fairly predictable because the state follows certain rules when 
applying that coercion. 
3 When we say that judges make law, we use the word ‘make’ in a very weak 
sense. There is, in every legal dispute, presumed to be a single correct an-
swer which follows from the application of the pre-existing law to the par-
ticular facts of the dispute and the judge is obliged to find that answer.10 
The third of these propositions is particularly important for the purposes of the 
present discussion. The judicial arm of government is charged with applying the 
law in order to resolve particular legal disputes. This is not always a simple 
mechanical exercise. The law needs to be interpreted in order to discover how it 
should be applied to novel situations. This task ought to be entrusted only to the 
most learned and experienced members of the legal profession, and they should 
expect to have to exercise a large measure of critical judgement in the course of 
arriving at an answer. Nevertheless, it is inconsistent with the idea of the rule of 
law to assert that judges might, even occasionally, have any real choice11 as to 
how they analyse a particular case. This assertion would be inconsistent with the 
notion that the parties to a dispute have entitlements which are defined by law, so 
 
 9 Keith Mason, ‘The Rule of Law’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays on Law and Government: Principles 
and Values (1995) vol 1, 114, 114. 
 10 The same implication is present in the following statement by F A Hayek, The Constitution of 
Liberty (1960) 153: 
It is because the lawgiver does not know the particular cases to which his rules will apply, and 
it is because the judge who applies them has no choice in drawing the conclusions that follow 
from the existing body of rules and the particular facts of the case, that it can be said that laws 
and not men rule. 
 11 The word ‘choice’ is used here to describe a situation where two or more alternative analyses are 
regarded as being equally correct for the purposes of the case at hand. 
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that one of them has (prior to and independently of the judge’s determination) a 
right to win. The exception which proves the rule is the situation where Parlia-
ment expressly confers a discretionary power upon judges to make determina-
tions about what the parties’ entitlements shall be.12 However, this power exists 
only because Parliament has expressly conferred it in that particular form. 
The proposition that disputes between citizens ought to be resolved according 
to law lies at the core of the insistence upon mutual exclusivity of categories. If it 
is not assumed that there is a correct answer to the dispute and that it is the 
judge’s obligation to find that answer (rather than merely an answer), it is being 
conceded that a litigant’s ‘rights’ in relation to that dispute might turn upon the 
idiosyncrasies of a particular judge. Waddams might argue that we are still some 
distance from establishing the proposition that legal categories must be mutually 
exclusive. The ‘correct’ answer in a particular case may, according to Waddams, 
be found in the concurrent and cumulative operation of two or more legal 
concepts.13 Waddams explained the famous decision in Lumley v Gye,14 which 
recognised a tort of interference in contractual relations, in the following terms: 
The question whether Gye was unjustly enriched and the question whether he 
was a wrongdoer were not resolved independently: it was the very fact that 
Gye’s enrichment from the transaction was perceived to be unjust that led the 
court to the conclusion that his conduct was wrongful, and vice versa, just as 
the same considerations taken together tended to support the conclusions that 
Lumley had something analogous to a proprietary interest, that it should be 
protected by injunction … and that the result conformed to public policy, con-
sidered from the point of view both of restraint of trade and observance of con-
tracts.15 
Waddams denied that Lumley v Gye stood for the proposition that inducement of 
breaches of contract is always wrongful and instead suggested that 
inducing breach of contract is wrongful where it infringes something analogous 
to a proprietary interest, where it causes an unjust enrichment, and where the 
public policy favouring freedom of action is outweighed by strong countervail-
ing considerations.16 
Even if we accept that Waddams’ analysis of Lumley v Gye is an accurate 
reflection of the reasoning of the majority of the Court in that case, we are left 
with the question of whether the decision is the product of legal reasoning within 
a rule of law framework or an aberration. The dissenting judge, Coleridge J, 
approached the case in quite a different way. Coleridge J acknowledged the 
existence of a large body of case law concerning the ‘seduction of servants’, 
which had its basis in a statute enacted during the reign of King Edward III, but 
could not find any foundation within this body of case law for a broader proposi-
 
 12 Consider, for example, the power of judges of the Family Court of Australia under the Family 
Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 79 to redistribute (in effect) the property of the parties to a marriage upon 
the breakdown of the marriage. This broad discretionary power is made tolerable by the re-
quirement that judges refer to certain criteria which are set out in the legislation. 
 13 Waddams, above n 5, 226–7, 230. 
 14 (1853) 2 El & Bl 216; 118 ER 749. 
 15 Waddams, above n 5, 33–4. 
 16 Ibid 36. 
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tion that the law responds to the procurement of a breach of contract.17 His 
Honour went on to say: 
I mention this case now as shewing how far courts of justice may be led if they 
allow themselves, in the pursuit of perfectly complete remedies for all wrongful 
acts, to transgress the bounds which our law, in a wise consciousness as I con-
ceive of its limited powers, has imposed on itself, of redressing only the proxi-
mate and direct consequences of wrongful acts.18 
This passage is an emphatic rejection of the ‘concurrent and cumulative opera-
tion’ approach. Commitment to the rule of law (as opposed to the rule of judges) 
requires that judges are restrained in the exercise of their powers by the need to 
identify the case before them as falling within an abstract category of cases in 
which the law dictates a response. 
The precise bounds of the factual territory covered by a category will not be 
known in advance, but to acknowledge this is not to deny the existence of a 
category of cases which is susceptible to abstract definition. To recognise that 
the outer limits of the factual reach of the tort of negligence are not known does 
not prevent us from stating an abstract definition for the category of cases which 
fall within those bounds. An appropriate definition would refer to B’s suffering 
of foreseeable harm as a result of A’s failure to exercise the standard of care that 
A ought to have exercised in the circumstances of the relationship between A and 
B. Definitions like this provide a framework for consistent adjudication among 
cases because they enable judges to identify facts (as they arise) that fall, prima 
facie, within the scope of a relevant liability category. Cases that appear, at first 
sight, to fall within a particular category may exhibit features which, when 
considered in the light of other notions of just conduct to which the law gives 
effect, justify treating them as falling outside the category that attracts liability. 
Moreover, defences to claims are often framed in terms of a weakness or 
deficiency in the very thing that justifies the claim. A plausible rationalisation of 
both the mitigating factor of contributory negligence and the defence of volenti 
non fit injuria is that there is conduct, on the plaintiff’s part, which tends to 
undermine a conclusion that the defendant’s lack of care is responsible for the 
plaintiff’s injury. 
There is always a possibility that boundaries of categories may be expanded 
outwards. It may be the case that the ‘seduction of servants’ cases referred to by 
Coleridge J were really to be understood as cases about procuring breaches of 
contract; that is, the category of ‘seduction of servants’ was a proxy for the 
category of ‘procuring a breach of contract’, which had become defined in the 
narrower way because this had been the sole factual context in which the 
relevant notion of just conduct had been offended. Acknowledging that this is a 
possible interpretation of the ‘seduction of servants’ cases does nothing to 
support Waddams’ analysis of Lumley v Gye because, in broadening the category 
of cases in which a legal response is justified to other events which are analo-
gous to the seduction of a servant, we must thereby commit ourselves to the view 
 
 17 Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 El & Bl 216; 118 ER 749. 
 18 Ibid 252; 732. 
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that the response is justified in all instances of the same type. Over time there 
may be considerable development of the features that a case must possess in 
order to be classified as the relevant type. Part of this development may involve 
relatively narrow definitions of legally relevant events becoming subsumed 
within broader definitions. Those broad definitions may, in the face of succes-
sive cases, be abandoned in favour of definitions that refer to other common 
features of the cases.19 Nevertheless, a commitment to the rule of law involves 
an aspiration towards doctrinal coherence. This requires that all resolutions of 
disputes can be understood in terms of a single, internally consistent body of 
principle. Old categories are abandoned in favour of new categories precisely 
because those new categories are seen to have a better fit within the overall 
structure of the law. 
The fundamental problem with the ‘cumulative and concurrent operation’ 
approach is that it provides a correct answer for that case and for that case only. 
If Waddams’ analysis of the majority reasoning in Lumley v Gye is correct, that 
reasoning would allow judges plenty of scope for impressionistic judgement in 
relation to whether the property analogy, the principle of unjust enrichment and 
public policy issues coalesce in the same way and carry the same cumulative 
weight in future cases. It would fail to provide litigants with a reliable basis for 
predicting the outcome in those future cases. 
Justice Antonin Scalia (writing extra-judicially) has suggested that allowing 
broad discretionary space to future courts can undermine the community’s 
confidence in the idea that everyone is equal before the law: ‘When a case is 
accorded different treatment to an earlier one, it is important, if the system of 
justice is to be respected, not only that the later case be different, but that it be 
seen to be so.’20 Justice Scalia insisted that judges can only ‘hedge themselves 
in’ to the extent that they announce rules.21 The ability of judges to state rules 
that dictate an outcome in the present case and bind them in relation to future 
cases depends upon their ability to identify clearly defined categories of situa-
tions, which can be seen to demand the same type of treatment. Treating a case in 
the same way as previous cases is justified by reference to an idea of just 
conduct, which is offended, or at risk of being offended, in each particular case. 
A judge cannot pluck this notion of just conduct out of thin air. It must be an idea 
of just conduct to which the judges have committed themselves in their previous 
decisions, even if they have done so implicitly. Unless a judge can say ‘I am 
bound to decide the case this way because it is a case that falls within category 
x’, it is difficult (if not impossible) for any other person to be confident that the 
 
 19 See, eg, Edward H Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949) 7–19, in which Levi traces 
how a single instance of a gun owner’s liability for injury caused to the plaintiff’s son by a 
person other than the owner became the basis for the development of a rule about ‘dangerous 
things’. This category was, in time, abandoned in favour of a rule about negligence. Of course, 
the concept of ‘negligence’ is itself subject to continual refinement by reference to the cases 
which are said to fall within it. A more recent example of this type of development is, of course, 
the emergence of a law of ‘unjust enrichment’ from the categories of ‘quasi-contract’ and certain 
other categories which are associated with relief in a restitutionary measure. 
 20 Justice Antonin Scalia, ‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’ (1989) 56 University of Chicago 
Law Review 1175, 1178 (emphasis in original). 
 21 Ibid 1180. 
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present decision is, in fact, consistent with previous decisions or that future 
decisions will be consistent with the present decision. 
I I I   THE CHARACTERISTICS  OF  LEGAL CATEGORIES 
Two observations may be made about classification in general. First, many 
objects may be classified in more than one way. To the extent that this is so in 
particular cases, classification systems are a product of human choice. In English 
private law, there is, as Waddams has noted, a two-way relationship between the 
science of legal classification and legal practice.22 Legal categories evolve on the 
basis of an accumulation of choices made by judges in successive cases. The 
judges’ exercise of choice is constrained by the obligation of the judiciary 
(implicit in the rule of law) to decide cases according to a single, internally 
coherent body of principle which endures over time and which permits only one 
correct answer in each case. Secondly, it is possible to have hierarchies of 
classification in the sense that a number of more specific categories may fall 
wholly within the bounds of a more general category. Very different maps of the 
law can be produced depending upon one’s choice as to the basic level of 
abstraction around which categories at higher and lower levels are proposed. 
A  Choice of Basis of Classification 
Legal categories have a prescriptive function. The categories guide members 
of a politico-legal community as to how they ought to behave and, in particular, 
how the officials of that community ought to resolve disputes between members 
of the community. They perform descriptive and predictive functions as well. 
They perform a descriptive function insofar as they enable everyone to recognise 
the types of dispute that ought to be resolved in any particular way. They 
perform a predictive function insofar as they provide individuals with a basis for 
forming expectations about how disputes they are having with their neighbours 
will be resolved in the event that they bring legal proceedings, or whether and 
how the state will respond to any acts that they might be tempted to perform 
upon their neighbours’ persons or property. Nevertheless, the prescriptive 
function is of primary significance for classification. To describe my relationship 
with another person as ‘contractual’ or (more generally) ‘consensual’ conveys the 
idea that it is right for me to perform particular actions which I have undertaken 
to perform or to bring about a particular result which I have undertaken to bring 
about. The description of the relationship as ‘contractual’ or ‘consensual’ carries 
with it a prescription that the undertaking ought to be performed. The physical 
characteristics of promising or consenting do not, of themselves, create an 
obligation to perform. The physical characteristics of the event of promising or 
consenting are combined with a widely-diffused attitude within the relevant 
politico-legal community that it is good to keep one’s promises or to uphold 
one’s consent once it has been given. The underlying attitude need not be 
 
 22 See Waddams, above n 5, 15. 
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universal.23 It need only be the prevailing common sense within the relevant 
politico-legal community. 
The foregoing example highlights two attributes of legal categories. First, legal 
categories are artificial, in the sense that they classify physical events according 
to human attitudes and interpretation of facts, rather than purely by reference to 
the physical properties of the events. Secondly, the categories used by the law of 
a free society (as opposed to a society organised according to the particular ends 
of the ruler) must refer to notions of just conduct that are grounded in the shared 
attitudes of members of the community.24 These attitudes consist of assumptions 
that certain types of conduct generate corresponding entitlements on the part of 
individual human beings. It follows that the use of coercion is justified for the 
sake of securing those entitlements. 
1 Artificiality 
Birks attempted to ground legal events in raw facts. A person could be said to 
have a right to a legal response because a particular type of factual event 
occurred.25 This view of events has been disputed by R B Grantham and C E F 
Rickett. They have argued that the law does not respond to ‘raw and unrecon-
structed happenings in the physical world’ but to ‘an interpretation of those 
physical happenings within the intellectual framework of the law.’26 The law’s 
recognition of a performance obligation depends upon ‘an interpretation of the 
physical occurrence of statements as amounting to an agreement as that latter 
concept is understood by the law’.27 It is not the bare fact that those statements 
were made, so much as it is the community’s interpretation of that event as 
belonging to an abstract category of events in which a performance response is 
justified, which gives rise to the legal obligation to perform. It is difficult to see 
how Birks’ insistence that physical events cause rights to come into existence 
can be sustained without the mediation of an attitude that the event justifies the 
response. Labelling events as ‘negligent damage’ or ‘unjust enrichment’28 
suggests, in itself, that the physical events of infliction of harm and receipt of a 
payment are not, respectively, adequate conditions for the existence of the 
obligations to pay reparation and to make restitution of the amount received. The 
additional factor is the community’s interpretation of the physical events as 
offending its notions of just conduct. 
The grounding of legal categories in notions of just conduct distinguishes legal 
categories from the zoological categories with which Birks frequently drew 
 
 23 Note Lawrence Rosen’s observation that Tongans have not traditionally regarded promising as 
creating any form of obligation: Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (2006) 113. 
 24 As to ‘just conduct’: see Friedrich A Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order 
(1973) vol 1, 86–7. In short, the word ‘just’ refers to the justice of the conduct itself rather than 
the justice of either the effects of the conduct or the ends being pursued by the actor. 
 25 Peter Birks, ‘Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment’ (2001) 79 Texas Law Review 1767, 
1778. 
 26 R B Grantham and C E F Rickett, ‘Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event’ (2003) 62 
Cambridge Law Journal 717, 723. 
 27 Ibid 724. 
 28 Birks, ‘Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment’, above n 25, 1778. 
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analogies.29 As Geoffrey Samuel has noted, legal science is unlike zoology 
insofar as it is not ultimately referable to a natural phenomenon which exists 
independently of and externally to the science.30 While the subject matter of 
zoological science is not perfectly analogous to the subject matter of law, it 
cannot be said that this observation is fatal to Birks’ central idea that legal 
responses ought to be classified according to the alignment of types of response 
with types of event. It does not follow from the proposition that the categories of 
the law reflect human attitudes rather than natural phenomena that those 
categories are arbitrary. The attitudes of the community (and of the judiciary in 
particular) to certain types of physical event are the reality that legal science 
attempts to describe. Of course, this is not a reality which can be verified in a 
laboratory in the way that the realities studied by biology, chemistry and physics 
can be. It is, to a large extent, self-perpetuating. A judge’s pronouncement that 
event a justifies response x tends to reinforce the general belief that event a 
justifies response x. Nevertheless, the demand for internal coherence within the 
network of rules enforced in any particular community exposes the proposition 
that event a justifies response x to an external check. When it is discovered that 
event a has sometimes led to response y, the proposition will be called into 
question. Either one proposition must drive out the other or we must consider 
whether what we have hitherto conceptualised as event a is better understood as 
two distinct types of event. The validity of any particular rule is a matter of 
coherence with the rest of the network, rather than a matter of our ability to 
deduce the content of the rule from proven propositions about the physical world 
or universally valid moral norms.31 
Reliance upon a coherence test for the validity of propositions is not peculiar 
to legal science. The economist and intellectual historian, Friedrich Hayek, 
described the categories of the social sciences as ‘selections of certain elements 
of a complex picture on the basis of a theory about their coherence.’32 While 
these categories do not stand for concrete things, they are saved from being 
arbitrary constructions or impositions to the extent that they are premised upon a 
valid theory about the relationships between the individual events or phenomena 
that are grouped together.33 The law’s categories are the product of theorising 
about the basis upon which the rules of the community might be understood as 
an internally coherent expression of the community’s sense of just conduct. 
The relationship between law and physical events, being mediated through the 
attitudes of a community, is similar to that between language and physical 
events. Every time we speak or write a sentence, we refer to a complex system of 
labels and taxonomies. The substantive vocabulary of a language consists of 
labels for categories of things or ideas. No two cats are exactly identical. The 
label ‘cat’ refers to a class of things that are related to one another in a way 
 
 29 See, eg, ibid; Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law’, above n 1, 6. 
 30 Geoffrey Samuel, ‘English Private Law: Old and New Thinking in the Taxonomy Debate’ (2004) 
24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 335, 340. 
 31 Samuel acknowledged that Birks’ approach to the testing of the validity of any particular 
explanation of legal practice was ‘a matter of coherence rather than correspondence’: ibid 342. 
 32 Friedrich Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason (1952) 55. 
 33 Ibid 56. 
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which human beings perceive to be important. Rules of grammar also rely upon 
categorisation of the concepts we wish to express. Before one chooses to say ‘a 
cat’, ‘the cat’, ‘cats’ or ‘the cats’ one needs to reflect — not necessarily at length 
— about whether one is talking about a single cat or a group of cats and whether 
the identity of the particular cat or cats is an important aspect of the meaning to 
be conveyed. Which rules come into operation depends upon one’s categorisa-
tion of the meaning to be conveyed. Each linguistic community will also be 
committed to rules concerning the representation of the sounds of a language in 
written form — that is, the orthography of the language. A small degree of 
variation of spelling and pronunciation within a linguistic community is tolerable 
— for example, ‘recognise’ and ‘recognize’ and the difference between the 
British/Australian and American pronunciations of ‘tomato’ — but these minor 
differences represent hard choices made within a larger framework that is the 
subject of general acceptance throughout the entire community. The choice is 
between two credible claimants for the status of ‘the rule’. The pluralism of 
spelling and pronunciation is, in both of the cases mentioned, the result of 
different sub-communities exercising that choice differently. 
The critical point is that linguistic forms carry meaning by social convention 
rather than by way of intrinsic correlation between sounds and concepts.34 The 
categories adopted by one linguistic community do not always align with the 
categories adopted by its neighbours. The French use the word mouton to 
describe both the animal and its meat, while the English use the word sheep to 
refer to the animal and the word mutton (which has an apparent etymological 
relationship with mouton) to describe the meat.35 The uses of the Swedish 
prepositions på, vid and i do not align perfectly with the uses of their English 
equivalents on, at and in. Furthermore, the precise coverage of a word, gram-
matical form or orthographical symbol may change over time, although this 
process is nearly always a gradual one whereby people who have learnt to speak 
according to an older convention diminish in number by way of natural attrition 
over an extended period of time. Nevertheless, for the time being, the recognised 
categories provide both a framework within which people may learn the lan-
guage — so, for example, people who are learning to speak a language have to 
have the same understanding of when they should use a hard consonant and 
when they should use a soft consonant as prevails among the existing speakers of 
that language36 — and a framework within which means of communicating new 
ideas may be developed.37 Development occurs by way of small changes within 
the framework of a system that is otherwise stable. 
 
 34 Philippe Wolff, Western Languages: AD 100–1500 (Frances Partridge trans, 1971 ed) 10. 
 35 Ibid. 
 36 In English, the letter ‘c’ represents a soft consonant before ‘e’ and ‘i’ (for example, receive, 
cigar) and a hard consonant before other vowels (for example, cat, cake, cot, cut). The letter ‘k’ 
is always hard, except when followed by ‘n’, in which event the ‘k’ is silent. In Swedish, ‘c’ is 
always soft, while ‘k’ is hard before ‘a’, ‘o’, ‘u’ and ‘å’ (for example, kaka, cookie/biscuit) but 
soft (that is, sounds like the English ‘sh’) before ‘e’, ‘i’, ‘y’, ‘ä’ and ‘ö’ (for example, kyrka, 
church). Swedes, in common with speakers of other Germanic languages, pronounce both the ‘k’ 
and the ‘n’ in ‘kn’. 
 37 The development of compound words, which are common in Germanic languages, is a good 
example of this. Consider the Danish words samarbejde (‘together work’, that is, cooperate), 
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The success of legal systems, like that of linguistic systems, depends upon the 
existence of fairly stable rules, which presuppose the existence of categories of 
things. The categories and their attendant rules provide a basis upon which 
people may hold reasonable expectations about the conduct of others (including 
the application of coercion by the officials of the community) and these expecta-
tions become the foundation for orderly interaction between members of a 
community. 
2 Notions of Just Conduct 
It has already been noted that legal propositions have a particular type of 
content, which is that A has an entitlement that B behaves in a particular manner 
towards A. A is consequently entitled to enlist the coercive powers of the state to 
ensure that B behaves in that manner. The validity of legal rules does not depend 
upon those rules being grounded upon proven facts about the physical world or 
upon universally valid moral truths. The position taken here is something like 
that which Stephen A Smith has described as the ‘moderate approach’.38 We can 
observe the practice of a legal community and see that coercion is seen to be 
justified in certain types of situation. Any argument which is advanced in order 
to justify coercion in any particular case must be an argument of the same type as 
the arguments that have justified coercion in the prior practice of that legal 
community.39 Arguments which proceed on the basis of categories which are 
‘foreign to the concepts and lexicon of the law’ will not be accepted.40 To accept 
these arguments would be to undermine the law’s character as an internally 
coherent system of justified coercion. 
It is possible to isolate several key characteristics which arguments must 
exhibit in order to be acceptable as proper legal argument within English private 
law (and those systems derived from it). First, arguments must proceed on the 
basis that, if B is to be coerced to act in a particular way, then any other person 
whose circumstances are identical (in terms of the argument) to those of B must 
be liable to be coerced to act in the same way. Neil MacCormick emphasised this 
aspect of legal reasoning when he said that reasons for decisions must be 
universalisable — that is, treating like cases alike ‘implies that I must decide 
today’s case on grounds which I am willing to adopt for the decision of future 
similar cases, just as much as it implies that I must today have regard to my 
earlier decisions in past similar cases.’41 The requirement of universalisability 
 
samtale (‘together speak’, that is, conversation), samtidigt (‘together timely’, that is, simultane-
ous) and samfund (‘together find’, that is, society). 
 38 Stephen A Smith, ‘Taking Law Seriously’ (2000) 50 University of Toronto Law Journal 241, 
254–5. 
 39 Ibid 254. 
 40 Ibid 255. 
 41 Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1994) 75. It should not be thought that 
universalisability depends upon the existence of an antecedent moral principle. R M Hare, Free-
dom and Reason (1963) 38 pointed out that even Jean-Paul Sartre held to the idea of universalis-
ability and explained the idea in this way: 
We have to consider the particular case and make up our minds what are its morally relevant 
features, and what, taking these features into account, ought to be done in such a case. Never-
theless, when we do make up our minds, it is about a matter of principle which has a bearing 
outside the particular case. 
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flows naturally from the notion that human interaction is governed by law and 
not by any person’s preferences as to the outcome in the particular case. The 
argument that B, having negligently caused injury to A, should pay damages to A 
implies that everyone who negligently causes injury to another must pay 
damages to that other person. The categories of negligence, causation and injury 
may need to be refined over a large number of cases, but the argument proceeds 
on the basis that A has an entitlement and B has a duty because their circum-
stances fit into a category of circumstances to which the law attaches conse-
quences. Arguments applicable to the circumstances of A and B but not poten-
tially applicable to unknown future plaintiffs and defendants are not admissible. 
Secondly, arguments must proceed on the assumption that the network of rules 
used to resolve disputes is internally coherent. No rule can be inconsistent with 
any other rule that belongs to the same system. In deference to Ronald Dworkin, 
one might call this requirement the requirement of integrity.42 Every first-year 
law student knows that the law is not completely free of inconsistencies. It would 
be remarkable if a system which is the product of the operation of many minds 
over several centuries were to be free of inconsistencies. The key point is that 
legal argument must proceed on the basis of an assumption of internal coherence 
‘so that each person’s situation is fair and just according to the same stan-
dards.’43 It is a worthy aspiration that the law should deal with every person 
according to an identical standard, even if human frailties prevent the perfect 
fulfilment of that aspiration. 
Where, on the basis of the previously articulated law, there are two or more 
different rules which would appear to apply to a case, so that the parties’ dispute 
may be resolved in two or more different ways, the adjudicator must look for a 
reason for deciding the case in one or another of those ways. The adjudicator 
may have to abandon or revise a previously accepted theory about the law’s 
coherence. This means that there will always be some degree of dynamism and 
instability within the law’s categories. This dynamism and instability does not 
undermine the law’s integrity. The types of case that come before the courts may 
change over time — on account of, for example, changing technology or social 
conditions44 — and those novel cases may serve to reveal the incoherences in 
existing categories. This dynamism and instability is part of the quest for 
integrity. 
A third possible requirement is that the argument proceed on the basis that it is 
right, as between A and B, that B should behave in a particular way towards A. 
The argument must be articulated in terms of B having a duty towards A and A 
having a right as against B. This requirement is best summed up in the proposi-
tion that English private law is a system of corrective justice rather than a system 
concerned directly with the overall distribution of benefits and burdens within a 
community. Ernest J Weinrib, in what is perhaps the best known recent correc-
tive justice account of private law, linked the corrective justice idea with 
 
 42 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) ch 7. 
 43 Ibid 243. 
 44 Levi, above n 19, 103. 
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Immanuel Kant’s idea of right45 — that is, right is ‘the sum of conditions under 
which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance 
with a universal law of freedom.’46 If A and B are in a contractual relationship, 
both parties would desire that the other party perform its contractual undertaking. 
If B were to say that A must perform its undertaking while denying that it is 
obliged to perform its own undertaking, B denies A’s status as a free and equal 
individual. The law of contract recognises that each party has possession of the 
other party’s choice within the scope of that party’s undertaking.47 
Whether private law conforms perfectly to the corrective justice model ad-
vanced by Weinrib has been a matter of intense debate.48 It will suffice, for the 
moment, to make two observations. First, at an empirical level, it may be 
observed that English private law has developed in the context of particular 
bipolar disputes. Its precepts are universalisations of the reasons why particular 
defendants were found to owe duties to particular plaintiffs. These precepts may, 
over time, have proved themselves to be conducive to the general welfare of the 
community, but they are first and foremost directed towards justice between 
individuals. Secondly, at a philosophical level, it may be observed that the 
requirements of universalisability, integrity and corrective justice combine to 
underpin a system of principle which regards people as free and equal agents. 
The system treats people as free and equal because a rule which applies in the 
case of a dispute between A and B applies equally to all disputes of the same 
type, novel disputes are to be resolved according to a rule which is consistent 
with the known rules of the system and B is coerced only to the point necessary 
to secure an identical degree of freedom of action on the part of both A and B. 
Consequently, A and B will have considerable freedom to plan their lives within 
a framework of reasonable expectations about the conduct of others. A system of 
dispute resolution which emphasises the effect of the outcome upon the distribu-
tion of benefits and burdens at the community level, by contrast, leaves the 
individual with no reasonable expectations that could be asserted in opposition to 
the adjudicator’s perceptions as to the welfare of the community as a whole. 
Notions of just conduct, understood as principles which define what is proper 
conduct as between individuals and which are universalisable and consistent 
with all other principles to which the relevant community adheres, are the 
subject matter of legal classification. Concepts such as contract, trespass and 
negligence are appropriate classifications of legal events because they link 
particular types of factual scenario with an internally coherent system of 
universalisable justifications for coercing individuals to behave towards other 
individuals in a particular way. 
 
 45 Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (1995) 95. 
 46 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Mary Gregor trans, 2nd revised ed, 1996) 56 [trans 
of: Die Metaphysik der Sitten]. 
 47 Ibid 90–1. 
 48 For discussion of weaknesses in the corrective justice explanation of certain aspects of private 
law: see Dennis Klimchuk, ‘Unjust Enrichment and Corrective Justice’ in Jason W Neyers, 
Mitchell McInnes and Stephen G A Pitel (eds), Understanding Unjust Enrichment (2004) 111. 
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B  Hierarchies of Categories 
There can be categories within categories. ‘Mansion’ and ‘bungalow’ are more 
specific than ‘house’, while ‘dwelling’ is more general than ‘house’. The term 
‘house’ is the one that we use most frequently in daily conversation and consti-
tutes the basic level of categorisation for this series of concepts. The more 
specific categories of ‘mansion’ and ‘bungalow’ emphasise the physical features 
which distinguish one thing from the other. The more general category of 
‘dwelling’ embraces many things which are very different in their physical 
features, such as ‘igloo’, ‘tepee’, ‘gunyah’, ‘house’ and ‘apartment’. What binds 
these things together and defines the category is the purpose for which human 
beings use them. James Penner has called this ‘interest-related knowledge’.49 It 
reflects an attitude formed towards a thing on the basis of ‘the way we character-
istically interact with the thing in question to serve our various interests.’50 
Interest-related characteristics are obviously of considerable importance in legal 
classifications because they provide a foundation for supposing that human 
beings have legitimate claims that others ought to behave in particular ways. To 
put it another way, the existence of common human interests in being able to do 
certain types of things provides a basis for supposing what are reasonable 
expectations about the conduct of other people and, hence, a foundation for 
justifying coercion. 
Penner suggested that the basic level of categorisation will usually be that level 
where the knowledge of physical characteristics and interest-related knowledge 
converge.51 Penner used the concept of ‘chair’ to illustrate the point.52 Chairs are 
things that we sit upon. That interest places limits upon the physical form that a 
chair may take, from which we can recognise that the thing is a chair.53 Penner 
observed that the law has a basic level category called ‘assaults’ which encom-
passes a number of diverse events, all of which involve an actual or threatened 
application of force by one person to another (physical characteristic) and 
provoke ‘perceptions like pain or near-universal emotional reactions like anger 
or sadness or fear’ (interest).54 More recently, Penner (drawing on the work of 
the philosopher Bernard Williams) has described concepts such as ‘assault’ and 
‘murder’, in which fact and value judgement are united, as ‘thick evaluative 
concepts’.55 Penner suggested that reliance upon these thick evaluative concepts 
is typical of English private law. The law exists in the cases insofar as particular 
cases trigger our knowledge about values (which are represented by thick 
evaluative concepts) and provide us with ‘new knowledge’ about those values.56 
 
 49 James Penner, ‘Basic Obligations’ in Peter Birks (ed), The Classification of Obligations (1997) 
81, 94. 
 50 Ibid. 
 51 Ibid. 
 52 Ibid. 
 53 Ibid. 
 54 Ibid. 
 55 J E Penner, ‘Legal Reasoning and the Authority of Law’ in Lukas H Meyer, Stanley L Paulson 
and Thomas W Pogge (eds), Rights, Culture, and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political 
Philosophy of Joseph Raz (2003) 71, 83. 
 56 Ibid 94. 
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This new knowledge is used ‘to refine and explain only a relatively small portion 
of [our] body of knowledge, and at a suitably low level of abstraction.’57 
The critical insight to be gained from Penner’s work is that legal classification 
is neither solely a matter of empirical observation of physical properties nor 
solely an exercise in abstract moral reasoning. Legal classification ought to 
begin at a level of abstraction somewhat lower than the series of consent, 
wrongs, unjust enrichment and other events employed by Birks. ‘Contract’ is a 
likely candidate for status as a basic level category because it involves a factual 
event, namely A undertaking to do something on the basis that B does something 
or undertakes to do something, and an evaluation of that event as generating 
entitlements on the part of each of A and B that the other party will do what it 
has undertaken to do. ‘Nuisance’ is another likely candidate because it involves 
an act or omission, the consequences of which are unpleasant to human senses 
(such as noise or foul odours) and an evaluation that people who occupy land in 
the vicinity ought to be able to enjoy their land free from those types of interfer-
ence. The category ‘express trust’ would also qualify as a basic level category 
because there is an act of reposing trust in another (‘trustee’) to manage property 
for the benefit of the donor, a third party or a charitable purpose, and an evalua-
tion that it would be unjust for trustees to deal with property in any way which is 
contrary to the basis upon which the property was given to them. 
To identify this level of abstraction as the basic level of classification is not a 
denial of the usefulness of more abstract categories. If we conceptualise both 
contracts and express trusts as consensual undertakings of obligations, that 
conceptualisation may not be entirely irrelevant to legal reasoning insofar as it 
draws our attention to a common theme as to the types of human interest which 
the law protects. The presence of this common theme suggests that the two 
categories ought to be treated in the same way for at least some purposes — for 
example, both damages for breach of contract and compensation for breach of a 
trustee’s duty of administration ought to be concerned with placing the plaintiff 
in the position in which they would have been had the duty been performed58 — 
but they might be treated differently for other purposes. The critical point is that 
while abstract superordinate categories arise from common characteristics in the 
basic level categories, higher level categorisation may feed back into our 
understanding of the scope of the basic level categories insofar as it carries 
important information about the legal community’s understanding of the basic 
level categories. 
The search for superordinate categories enables us to see, for example, that any 
supposition that the law of trusts represents a basic level category in An-
glo-Australian law is false. ‘Express trusts’ is a possible basic level category 
because all of the events which belong to that category seem to draw a response 
from the law on the same normative basis. They are all situations in which 
someone has undertaken to administer property, of which they are the legal 
owner, for the benefit of another person. We know that some trusts do not arise 
 
 57 Ibid. 
 58 Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64; Re Dawson; Union Fidelity 
Trustee Co Ltd v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1966] 2 NSWR 211. 
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on the basis of a consensual undertaking. Therefore, ‘trusts’ cannot belong to a 
superordinate category which consists of consensual undertakings. That said, 
‘consensual undertakings’ does explain several legal categories, including 
‘contracts’ and ‘express trusts’, and is the very type of explanation which is 
typical of legal categories; that is, it is a universalisable proposition which 
explains the coherence of a number of more specific rules within the system and 
it secures an identical freedom of action for both parties to a bipartite relation-
ship. As such, the category of ‘trusts’ needs to be dissected. ‘Express trusts’ can 
be a basic level category which falls, together with ‘contracts’ and ‘gifts’, within 
a superordinate category of ‘consensual undertakings’. We need to investigate 
the normative bases for the other so-called trusts in order to ascertain whether 
there is a common normative basis, so that they can form a single basic level 
category, or whether we are dealing with a range of quite distinct legal events. 
By this process, we can see that categories such as ‘constructive trust’ — 
arguably one of the most unhelpful labels in English private law — do nothing to 
enhance the law’s intelligibility and may be counterproductive. 
IV  WHAT ABOUT EQUITY? 
It might be thought that equity, being concerned with overriding or placing 
conditions on the operation of common law rules, poses a particularly forceful 
challenge to the model of legal reasoning set out in the preceding Parts. It will 
now be argued that, whatever may have been the situation in the late Middle 
Ages, modern equity is committed to the values of universalisability, integrity 
and corrective justice in the same way as the common law. If there is need for 
caution in classifying and defining the events to which equity responds, it is 
merely that the history of equity as an ameliorative jurisdiction continues to 
inform the scope of the operation of the equitable rules and, this being the case, 
we should not be too eager to assimilate every equitable rule with its apparent 
common law analogy. 
A  Equity and Rules 
Graham Virgo has suggested that equity is best understood today as ‘the tech-
nical system of Equity as administered by the Court of Chancery’.59 Virgo has 
noted that there are two other notions of equity which are ‘still at play’60 — the 
notion of equity as ‘overriding or correcting the effect of rules’ and the notion of 
equity as ‘good conscience and natural justice’.61 Something of these notions of 





 59 Graham Virgo, ‘Restitution through the Looking Glass’ in Joshua Getzler (ed), Rationalizing 
Property, Equity and Trusts: Essays in Honour of Edward Burn (2003) 83, 85. 
 60 Ibid. 
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the ecclesiastical natural law foundations of equity, its concern with standards 
of conscience, fairness, equality and its protection of relationships of trust and 
confidence, as well as its discretionary approach to the grant of relief, stand in 
marked contrast to the more rigid formulae applied by the common law and 
equip it better to meet the needs of the type of liberal democratic society which 
has evolved in the twentieth century.62 
Sir Anthony conceded that the concept of good conscience is ‘not susceptible of 
sharp definition’.63 Sir Anthony suggested that uncertainties ‘will be dissipated 
by an increase in the number of decisions on a wide range of fact situations.’64 
Birks had a very different attitude towards equity. Birks disliked equity’s 
persistent reliance upon broad, ill-defined concepts such as ‘unconscionable 
behaviour’ and ‘equitable fraud’, which he thought concealed a ‘private and 
intuitive evaluation’.65 Birks insisted that judges should not be makers of social 
policy, as that task belongs to elected officials.66 In societies in which competi-
tion between different sets of values is real, judges have to be seen to be working 
within a relatively stable legal order — in Birks’ words, ‘an analysis anchored in 
authority’67 — rather than imposing their own value judgements under the cloak 
of relatively undefined concepts such as unconscionability. It is the judge’s 
obligation to decide cases consistently with the established rules, which link 
types of case with types of response, thereby preserving the legitimacy of the 
law’s coercion in the public eye.68 The approach to equity espoused by Sir 
Anthony Mason, on the other hand, reposes considerable trust in a supposed 
ability of adjudicators to analogise directly from case to case with little or no 
mediation by way of stable rules. 
If uncertainty really is to be dissipated in the long run and confidence in the 
rule of law maintained, it will be because adjudicators and litigants can recognise 
that certain types of case ought to be treated in certain ways. MacCormick has 
insisted that both common law and equity consist of universalisable propositions: 
Equity cannot be understood, I would suggest, as something particular by con-
trast to the universalizability of justice. The contrast can rather and rightly be 
set as between law and equity, and only then in the sense that formal rules of 
positive law may work injustice in their application, which may justify the 
creation of exceptions to the law for classes of situations to which for good rea-
son the previously declared or enacted law ought not to be applied. But as that 
in itself says, equity is as much a matter of what is universalizable as is jus-
tice.69 
MacCormick, in this passage, emphasised that equity, far from being a departure 
from the notion of justice according to rules, merely overrides or corrects the 
 
 62 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary 
Common Law World’ (1994) 110 Law Quarterly Review 238, 239. 
 63 Ibid 258. 
 64 Ibid. 
 65 Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law’, above n 1, 16–17. 
 66 Ibid 17. See also Peter Birks, ‘Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism’ (2000) 
29 University of Western Australia Law Review 1, 15. 
 67 Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law’, above n 1, 22. 
 68 Birks, ‘Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism’, above n 66, 15. 
 69 MacCormick, above n 41, 98–9. 
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effects of those particular common law rules. He referred to classes of situations 
in which the previously declared law should be applied. That the rules of the 
common law may have an unjust or unconscionable operation in some cases 
presupposes that we are able to devise generic descriptions of those types of 
case. 
Any suggestion that this view of equity is ahistorical should not detain us for 
too long. Sarah Worthington has pointed out that while equity’s origins lie in the 
exercise of the King’s ‘bounty’ to save litigants from injustices arising from the 
rigid application of rules, political conditions in England conspired to ensure that 
it evolved into a system of rule-based justice. The writs, the jury system and 
political tensions between the common law judges and the Royal Court had the 
effect that the common law judges were unwilling or unable to refine the law 
using methods that modern common lawyers would regard as commonplace. 
Accordingly, the ‘evolutionary pressure’ to incorporate the King’s bounty into 
the law of England ‘sought another outlet.’70 This outlet was the jurisdiction of 
the Chancellor and, later, the Court of Chancery. The development of equity 
from the exercise of the King’s bounty to a system of rule-based justice adminis-
tered by technical lawyers was reinforced by the ascendancy of parliamentary 
democracy over royal power from the middle of the 17th century. In these 
conditions, the idea that justice was the gift of the King was no longer politically 
acceptable.71 
The related question of whether equity adheres to a doctrine of precedent must 
also be taken to be resolved in the affirmative. W H D Winder collated evidence 
extending back to the early 17th century showing that Chancellors relied upon 
previous decisions.72 The historical differences between the common law and the 
Chancery attitude to precedent could be summed up in terms of the greater width 
of equitable principles and the Chancery emphasis upon the authority of the 
‘course of the decisions’ rather than upon the authority of the single decision.73 It 
might be said that, insofar as differences did exist in the past, they were differ-
ences of degree rather than kind. 
Virgo was correct to suggest that equity is best understood as ‘the technical 
system of Equity as administered by the Court of Chancery’.74 The labels 
‘common law’ and ‘equity’ refer to the historical origin of the relevant rules, 
rather than to a rule-based system, in the first case, and a non-rule-based system, 
in the second. 
B  Equity as an Ameliorative Jurisdiction 
The observation that equity consists of rules and is barely distinguishable from 
the common law in methodological terms raises the question of whether the two 
bodies of rules can be integrated into one, internally coherent whole. This course 
 
 70 Sarah Worthington, Equity (2006) 10. 
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has been advocated by Worthington,75 with the apparent approval of Birks.76 
While a commitment to the coherence of the law as a whole must ultimately 
push the law in that direction, there is a reason for exercising caution. As Virgo 
noted, the notion that equity overrides or corrects the effects of common law 
rules is still at play,77 and it may be surmised that the ameliorative function of 
the equitable rules has informed the scope of their application. 
 Equity was, for much of its history, conceived as a body of principle that was 
concerned with supplementing, rather than competing with, the common law. 
F W Maitland gave particular attention to this aspect of equity’s character, 
describing it as ‘a collection of appendixes’.78 The principles of equity, in their 
classical form, presupposed the prior application (or applicability, at least) of 
common law rules and operated to prevent or correct certain recognised abuses 
of the common law. While this aspect of the nature of equity was perhaps 
obscured by the advent of the Judicature Acts,79 P D Finn detected a 
re-emergence of this theme in the equity jurisprudence of the High Court of 
Australia during the 1980s.80 Finn said that equity ‘seeks to prevent an insistence 
upon strict legal rights where unconscionable conduct has attended their acquisi-
tion or would inhere in their proposed exercise’.81 The concept of unconscion-
able conduct is obviously too broad and open-textured to be capable of direct 
application to particular cases. Nevertheless, Finn’s observation is valuable 
insofar as it points to a layering of the notions of just conduct which underpin the 
law. Common law rights, the recognition of which is underpinned by certain 
attitudes about the justice of actions, may be used in a way which offends certain 
other attitudes about the justice of actions. The common law’s unwillingness or 
inability to incorporate those attitudes into its rules left space for another set of 
adjudicators to respond to those attitudes. 
If we fail to appreciate the sequential operation of common law and equity, we 
risk distorting the rules of equity. The troublesome issue of the juridical basis of 
equitable estoppel is a case in point. In many cases, equitable estoppel operates 
so as to require a person who makes a promise or representation to make good 
the promise or representation even though that person would not have been 
obliged to do so at common law, owing, for example, to the absence of consid-
eration or observance of the proper formalities.82 It is tempting to say that equity 
has added to the list of situations in which the law requires a person to make 
good a promise or representation. If this was the best possible interpretation of 
equitable estoppel, there would be no point in talking about the ‘equitable’ aspect 
 
 75 Worthington, above n 70, 306–7. 
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of the principle. We could state, as Birks did, that the law enforces promises 
where there is a deed, consideration or estoppel.83 Indeed, one might go further 
and state that since everything which falls within the category ‘consideration’ 
would also fall within the category ‘induced detrimental reliance’, there would 
be no point in talking about the doctrine of consideration. Closer investigation 
reveals that, in Australia at least, equitable estoppel does not do exactly the same 
work as consideration or a deed.84 Induced detrimental reliance merely generates 
an entitlement on the part of the relying party not to be left worse off as a result 
of its reliance. The inducing party must, on account of the fact that it encouraged 
the reliance, ensure that the relying party is no worse off than it would have been 
had it not been induced to rely.85 Mere induced detrimental reliance, as opposed 
to a promise made under seal or with consideration, does not justify imposing an 
obligation upon the inducing party to place the relying party in the position in 
which it would have been had the promise been performed or the representation 
been true. This interpretation of the juridical basis of equitable estoppel keeps the 
law of contract, as developed at common law, intact. Equity does not sec-
ond-guess the common law of contract about the circumstances in which a 
person may assert an entitlement to the making good of a promise or representa-
tion. It provides a different type of entitlement to a person who cannot assert a 
contractual entitlement. The practical effect may be identical in many cases, but 
the entitlement to which equity gives effect is one of a different type. 
Other contributions of equity — notably the law of trusts — cannot be under-
stood other than in terms of the sequential operation of common law and 
equitable rules. The trustee is the legal owner of the trust property and is 
empowered to deal with the property as the owner. Equity merely restrains the 
trustee’s use of the rights of ownership in certain situations where such use 
would be inconsistent with the trustee’s undertaking to use the property for the 
benefit of the objects of the trust. The proprietary rights of the objects are not of 
the same character as legal ownership. They give way in the face of the claim of 
a third party who has acquired its interest in good faith, for valuable considera-
tion and without notice of the trustee’s breach of duty. Once again, equity does 
not second-guess the common law about ownership of property. It merely 
recognises that a particular class of owners have particular duties to a particular 
class of people and those people have corresponding entitlements against those 
owners. 
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effect does. 
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None of the foregoing comments should be interpreted as opposition to the 
assimilation of common law and equitable rules where equity is doing the same 
work as the common law. The maintenance of different rules which could 
potentially apply to the same sets of circumstances offends the idea of integrity. 
Andrew Burrows has identified quite a number of areas in which common law 
and equity ‘do not co-exist coherently’.86 If it is important to us that the law 
provide an internally coherent system of justification, this situation cannot be 
tolerated. Naturally, these incoherencies need to be resolved one at a time, which 
is what Burrows appears to advocate.87 This process appears to be occurring, in 
England and New Zealand at least, in relation to compensation for trustees’ 
breaches of their duties. In these jurisdictions, the fact that the duty is a trustee’s 
duty is not of itself relevant to the measure of compensation. What matters is 
whether, on the one hand, the trustee’s breach relates to its obligation to adminis-
ter the trust property according to the terms of the trust or whether, on the other 
hand, the trustee has been negligent in carrying out an authorised transaction. 
There is no legal reason to treat the latter any differently from any other situation 
in which the law requires a negligent defendant to pay compensation.88 
Attempting to incorporate all common law and equitable rules into a single 
map of the law does not mean aggregating common law and equitable categories 
on the basis of any point of similarity between them. We must distinguish 
between two ways in which equity supplements the common law. 
The first of the ways in which equity supplements the common law is by 
adding to the specific circumstances in which a particular type of legal response 
is seen to be justified. A good example is equity’s expansion (under the nomen-
clature of actual undue influence) of the circumstances in which a transaction 
may be set aside on the ground that the will of one of the parties was overborne 
by the other. The equitable doctrine of actual undue influence and the common 
law doctrine of duress fulfil the same notion of just conduct. If one of the parties’ 
consent to the transaction was produced by coercion, that party may avoid the 
transaction.89 That party’s refusal to perform does not deny the other party’s 
status as a free and equal person. The party who did the coercing cannot insist 
upon performance of the transaction because the very element that justifies 
restraining the other party from choosing not to perform — namely, consent 
freely given — is absent. Not only may the categories of duress and actual undue 
influence be aggregated into a single category, but we can say, without hesita-
tion, that the aggregated category forms a category of cases within both the law 
of contract and the law of gifts, which are, in turn, basic level categories within 
 
 86 The areas that Burrows identifies are set-off, tracing, illegal contracts, compound interest, 
common law strict restitutionary liability subject to change of position compared with equitable 
‘knowing receipt’ liability, and laches compared with the general law on limitation of actions: 
Andrew Burrows, ‘We Do This at Common Law but that in Equity’ (2002) 22 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 1, 6–7. 
 87 Ibid 16. See also Andrew Burrows, ‘Remedial Coherence and Punitive Damages in Equity’ in 
Simone Degeling and James Edelman, Equity in Commercial Law (2005) 381, 383. 
 88 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1; Bank of New Zealand v New Zealand 
Guardian Trust Co Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 664. 
 89 Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation [1983] 1 AC 
366, 384 (Lord Diplock), 400 (Lord Scarman). 
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the superordinate category of consents. Duress and actual undue influence 
reverse neatly the element of consent which is the law’s justification for applying 
coercion in cases of contracts and gifts. As Burrows has suggested, there is no 
reason to retain both labels.90 
The second of the ways in which equity supplements the common law does not 
involve such a neat reversal of the justification for applying coercion at common 
law. Equitable estoppel, as conceived by the High Court in Waltons Stores,91 is, 
as already noted, an example of this. There is no legal justification for restraining 
the representor from failing to make good its representation. The law of contract 
and the law of gifts have no application. Nonetheless, the coercion of the 
representor to ensure that the representee is not left worse off as a result of 
relying upon the representation is legally justified. The harm suffered by the 
representee was not self-inflicted but was suffered because the representor’s 
conduct encouraged the representee to act in the way that it did. This justifies 
requiring the representor to place the representee as close as possible to the 
position that it would have been in had it not relied — bearing in mind that the 
only way of doing this in a particular case may be to require the representor to 
make good the representation92 — but it does not, of itself, justify coercing the 
representor to make good the representation. Equitable estoppel cannot be 
subsumed within either the law of contract or the law of gifts. A map of the law 
as it is must acknowledge this while simultaneously recognising the sequential 
relationship that equitable estoppel may have with these two bodies of law. 
V  CONCLUSION 
Those who object to maps of the law on the basis that they distort our view of 
legal practice fail to appreciate fully what it is that mapping of the law sets out to 
achieve. The famous, multicoloured map of the London underground railway 
system does not set out to be a representation of London in all its glorious 
variety and detail. It is a simplified and stylised representation of the London 
underground railway system which enables one to work out that, if one wants to 
travel from King’s Cross to Knightsbridge, one needs to catch a southbound train 
on the Piccadilly Line. Attention to the detail of the Gothic arches of Westmin-
ster Abbey, the baroque splendour of St Paul’s Cathedral, the Georgian facades 
of Gower Street and Belgrave Road and the open spaces of Hyde Park (along 
with perhaps the depressing greyness of some of the council housing estates) 
may be important if one wants to appreciate what London is really like, but this 
information does not assist one in getting from place to place within London. Its 
inclusion in the London underground railway system map would be an unneces-
sary (and possibly counter-productive) complication.  
Any map of English or Australian private law is, of course, more complex and 
varied than that of the London underground railway system. It also differs from 
 
 90 Burrows, ‘We Do This at Common Law but That in Equity’, above n 87, 6. 
 91 (1988) 164 CLR 387. 
 92 Consider, for example, how the plaintiff in Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101 might have 
been placed in the position that he would have occupied had he not relied upon his parents’ 
representations, and sought a home and pursued a career away from the family property. 
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the London underground railway system insofar as the process of description and 
systematisation has a dynamic effect upon the thing being described. The point 
of mapping the law is not to deny the law’s complexity and dynamism. Mapping 
creates an abstraction. It is a means of managing complexity and enabling the 
dissemination of the key features of the thing which is being mapped. Maps of 
the law serve the purpose of enabling those who have to use and rely upon the 
law to identify its principal components and how those components fit together 
into a single internally coherent system grounded in the community’s conception 
of justice. When we have an overall view of private law, we are in a better 
position to identify and iron out incoherencies and to resolve hard cases in a way 
that enhances the system’s coherence. Detailed study of the case law in particular 
areas is, of course, necessary in order to identify the law’s principal components. 
To acknowledge this is not to deny the value of mapping. The very idea of law 
(as opposed to arbitrary personal rule) involves an assumption that the law is an 
internally coherent system of justification for state coercion. Its major contours 
must be communicable and intelligible to all. Legal scholarship does itself a 
great disservice when it denies the value of mapping the law. 
